The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the major policy tool of the EU for achieving its Kyoto target, is the largest pollution permit market in the world. Following the lessons learned from the trial period (2005)(2006)(2007), new rules were adopted for the Kyoto commitment period (2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012) in order to enhance market quality and so reduce emissions in real-time. This study explores the liquidity effects of the new regime of rules for the Kyoto commitment period. We find evidence of a sustained increase in the liquidity of the carbon permits as a result of the new trading rules. However, we also find evidence of reductions in liquidity following regulatory changes after the commencement of the current phase.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) consented under provisions of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 8% below 1990 levels. In 2003, the EU Council provided the legislation to achieve this target through a council directive 1 establishing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). The EU-ETS was developed as the principal policy instrument to achieve the EU's obligations under the Kyoto protocol. The scheme went live in 2005 and has since grown to become the world's largest carbon market with an estimated market value of €122.3 billion in 2011 (see Kossoy and Guigon 2012) . As the EU-ETS is being keenly watched by policy makers around the world, its success or otherwise will be a factor in determining whether a global emissions trading scheme will eventually be adopted as a mechanism for limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
In this study, we identify liquidity as a precondition for the success of the EU-ETS and as a strong indication of market quality and efficient dissemination of trading-related information (see for example Eichler and Sobanski 2012) . To be effective, a cap and trade scheme such as the EU-ETS needs a large pool of participants that ensure an adequate volume and frequency of transactions; reliable price signals would then result in the carbon market. Liquidity is vital to this end and for the successful operation of any financial market, since it determines the ability to trade a security, quickly anonymously and with minimal price impact (Campbell, Lo et al. 1997) . Of course, liquidity cannot be directly inferred from improvements in transaction volumes in financial markets. Indeed Johnson (2008) shows that volume and liquidity are weakly related over time and the earlier work of Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Lee et al. (1993) find negative correlations.
In the trial phase (the so-called Phase I) of the EU-ETS, carbon permits were overallocated and some restrictive regulations (such as a ban on inter-temporal trading)
contributed to a largely illiquid market (see Frino, Kruk et al. 2010) . If the implementation of new regulations and allocation criteria for the operation of the Kyoto commitment phase (Phase II) of the scheme has been successful in reducing the over allocation of carbon allowances and improving market quality, we would expect a significant increase in market liquidity in the EU-ETS over time. We therefore investigate if there has been significant liquidity improvement after the start of trading in Phase II by using hand-collected trading data for December 2008 carbon futures, which are traded on the European Energy Exchange (EEX). We extend the study by examining the liquidity effects of emissions verification We examine volume changes 3 and ratios of bid-ask spread liquidity proxies. The basic motivation for this method is that bid-ask spreads computed from daily data are adequate measures of event impacts on liquidity of financial instruments. Dennis and Strickland (2003) , Pham et al. (2003) , Cao et al. (2004) , Schrand and Verrecchia (2005) and Lesmond et al. (2008) all employ similar methods. Liquidity measures play an important role in finance and hence have attracted tests of robustness. Goyenko et al. (2009) examine the most commonly used measures of liquidity in the finance literature. When measured against specific benchmarks, liquidity measures based on trading spread usually win the "horserace" on robustness. We thus implement ratios of the quoted and relative bid ask spread measures.
However, Lee and Ready (1991) indicate that the relative bid-ask spread may be an inaccurate measure of liquidity if many trades occur with the bid and ask prices. As we do not have intraday transactions data, we cannot ascertain the volume of trades within the spreads, hence, for robustness, we implement also the effective bid-ask spread measure after the method of Heflin and Shaw (2000) and Hedge and McDermott (2003) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and trading in the EU-ETS. Section 3 describes data and events selection, section 4 presents and discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
Background to the Study

Trading in the EU-ETS
The primary initial objective of the EU-ETS was to achieve the EU's commitment to the Kyoto Protocol by reducing aggregate GHG in EU countries. It functions as a hybrid cap and trade scheme since it allows restricted use of international carbon credits such as Carbon Emission Reduction (CER) and Emission Reduction Unit (ERU) 5 . Annual caps are set exogenously by national governments (subject to European Commission approval). Permits up to the amount of each cap are then distributed free (less a small proportion which is auctioned depending on the phase) to each regulated industrial installation. If an installation's emissions exceed its cap for a given compliance period, it must purchase the shortfall in the market. If an installation emits less than its capped amount, it will have surplus permits, which it can sell in the market. Accordingly, the difference between an installation's cap and the quantity of permits it produces represents the amount of permits the installation buys/sells in the market. The phase-dependent cap is fixed, and the permit price is endogenously determined in the EU-ETS secondary market in response to market forces.
In Phase I of the EU-ETS, EU countries allocated their nationally agreed quota of permits freely to installations. The combined total of these allocations then constituted the EU Banking ensures continuity, a key factor in financial markets and encourages confidence in the scheme. Daskalakis et al., 2011 for an overview of the EU-ETS).
Literature review
Extant literature on the liquidity of the EU-ETS is scarce; to our knowledge, there is only one published paper by Frino et al. (2010) . That study finds that liquidity improves over time for the EU-ETS. However, their results are not focused on analyzing liquidity effects of onset of trading in Phase II and the other events we examine, given that they only focus on quarterly results. Our study provides daily review of volume and liquidity changes over shorter windows and with respect to the evolution of transaction volumes. Two further unpublished manuscripts by Wei et al. (2008) and Benz and Klar (2008) look at liquidity in Phase I of the scheme. These papers are not directly relevant to our study, given that we focus on the liquidity changes between Phase I and Phase II of the EU-ETS. Ibikunle et al. (2013) study intraday liquidity for regular and after-hours markets during 2009 and their results suggest enhanced market maturity in Phase II. Kalaitzoglou and Maher Ibrahim (2013) also reach similar conclusions in their paper. However, we cannot use the results from these two papers as evidence of event-induced liquidity improvements in the EU-ETS as they investigate only intraday evolution of market variables.
Although Conrad et al. (2012) 
Events Selection and Data
We convert calendar time to event time (see Beneish and Gardner 1995) . 2 nd January 2008, which was officially the first day of trading in Phase II, is defined as event day 0. We select the December 2008 EUA futures contract trading on the EEX because it satisfies the following conditions and also accounts for more than 85% of trading volume during the period:
(a) The contract has data for a period of 90 trading days before and after the event.
(b) The contract is the most actively traded contract on the exchange 90 trading days before and after the event. We observe a scarcity of transactions on the EEX such that at any one period only one or two contracts are sufficiently traded, hence we examine events using the most actively traded contract at the period during which the event occurred.
We extend the study to include three other events (see Table 2 ). We apply conditions (a) and (b) above in the selection of futures contract to be examined for liquidity effects of the said events. The events chosen must satisfy the following condition only:
(c) No other event/announcement of direct relevance to the market occurs within 90 days before and after the chosen event in order to avoid the problem of confounding effects.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
We obtain daily data on trading volume for all futures contracts traded on the 
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Analysis
Panel A of Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the EUA futures trading in Phase I. Some observations are of interest. First, the high levels of bid-ask spreads, and the low average trading volume of the carbon permits suggest that the instruments are illiquid in 6 The data period extends beyond our immediate enquiry for the purpose of providing a descriptive view of market variables over an extended period (see Table 3 ).
Phase I of the EU-ETS scheme. This is expected given the lack of trading volume as a result of the over allocation of carbon permits. Also, there is a substantial variation between the relative and effective bid-ask spread. This implies that a significant proportion of the carbon trading occurs within the ask and bid quotes provided by the market maker. In Panel B (Phase II data), there is a marked narrowing of the liquidity proxies implying improved aggregate liquidity. We therefore expect results from subsequent analysis to confirm this improvement.
In both Panels of Table 3 , the summary statistics for the market liquidity proxies and trading activity measure of daily traded volumes are provided. The evidence points to higher intertemporal fluctuations in daily volume than in the liquidity proxies as implied by the higher coefficients of variation. The reason for this is that bid and ask prices are essentially discrete variables; this property helps in diminishing the potential for volatility through price clustering (Chordia, Roll et al. 2001 ).
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Trading Volume Changes: December 2008 and December 2009 EUA Futures Contracts
We test for the presence of abnormal trading volume in the event period by employing the following dummy variable time series regression model: respectively, values significant at 5% levels. After the 3 rd of January 2008, the abnormal volume decreases from the peak values but remains positive and significant at the 5% level.
The results for Events 2, 3 and 4 are also presented in the last three columns of Table   4 The regression in equation (1) (Copeland and Galai 1983) . The results of the long-term changes in trading volume are reported in Table 5 . values for post/pre ratio for Events 2 and 4 are 1.50 (1.34) and 2.66 (2.59). An interesting scenario is the recording of large and statistically significant post/pre ratios for event 3. In section 4.3, we examine if the observed long-term improvement is accompanied by long-term improvements in liquidity. 8 The estimates in Tables 4 and 5 provide little indication of what to expect since liquidity and trading volumes are weakly related, in fact the innovations of both variables can be conditionally uncorrelated (Johnson 2008) . 8 We also analyze the post/pre ratio of long term trading volume over 20, 30, 40 and 60 event day windows. The estimates are very similar to the 90-day event window reported in Table 5 . The results are not shown but are available upon request.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Liquidity Effects of Events: December 2008 and December 2009 EUA Futures Contracts
In order to analyze the impact of the start of Phase II EU-ETS trading and other events on the short term liquidity of carbon permits, we construct ratios of the daily average quoted, relative and effective bid-ask spreads over various event windows in the pre and post
Phase II trading period. The relative bid-ask spread is computed as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the mid-price. However, as pointed out by Lee and Ready (1991) , the relative bid-ask spread has two potential shortcomings. First, it overstates the trading costs of a stock because it fails to account for the tendency of prices to rise following a purchase and fall following a sale. Second, it can be argued that the relative bid-ask spread is an inappropriate measure of stock liquidity due to the fact that trades frequently occur within the ask and bid prices. Therefore, to account for these two shortcomings we as well compute the effective bid-ask spread after the methodology of Hedge and McDermott (2003) . Effective bid-ask spread is defined as twice the absolute value of the difference between trade price and the prevailing mid-price. There is also a potential problem with the use of either the relative or the effective bid-ask spread. The problem is that any event that changes the mid-price, will automatically impact upon the bid-ask spread. Therefore, for completeness, we also compute the quoted bid ask spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price. The quote spread is immune from this problem. The quoted bid-ask spread is also constructed because it is a measure that encapsulates the economic significance of the spread to the market-maker, (Branch and Freed 1997) . 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
We extend this analysis to the three other selected events and the results are also presented in Table 6 . For Events 2 and 4, the short term significant narrowing of quoted bid- Table 4 , the negative and significant estimates indicate decrease in trading activity and accordingly, we now show a loss of short term liquidity. Long term quoted and effective spread estimates indicate that on the long-term, market liquidity start to improve significantly. This is further confirmed by results earlier reported in Table 5 . The Post/Pre ratio mean (median) value of 4.72 (4.62) (t statistic of 3.76) is a strong indication that on the long-term, the policy is seen as a positive development for the market; hence participants react accordingly after the initial display of uncertainty.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Conclusion
Outcomes of recent COP meetings in Durban (2011) and Doha (2012) underline not only the growing international importance of emissions trading, but also the need for clear evidence on how well the EU-ETS is functioning. Policy making needs to be based on such evidence. This study examined liquidity effects (as a key element of market quality) on the EUA futures contracts with respect to key events and evolution of transaction volumes in Phase II.
Our findings show that the liquidity of EUA futures contracts is significantly enhanced when they are traded in Phase II of the EU-ETS. As the increase in liquidity spans a 90 trading day period after the commencement of Phase II, we suggest that there is a longterm improvement in the liquidity of the trading of carbon permits once they are traded in the latter stages of the EU-ETS. This is underscored by the fact that the tested contract, the while India's PAT scheme is the first step in that country's move towards establishing a cap and trade programme. Along with the EU-ETS and NZ-ETS, these schemes will provide the inter-regional framework for a possible global emissions trading scheme with the EU-ETS as the main driver. In view of these developments, the success of the EU-ETS could provide a platform for the introduction of a global mandatory market led approach to reducing carbon emissions. Given the paucity of literature on liquidity issues in the EU-ETS and the importance of global action on climate change, we believe that the findings in this study demand attention. 
